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France's National Assembly rejects controversial encryption backdoor that would have allowed silent government surveillance in apps like Signal and WhatsApp. A major victory for privacy advocates with global implications for digital security.
In a significant win for digital privacy advocates, the French National Assembly recently rejected a controversial proposal that would have fundamentally undermined end-to-end encryption under the guise of fighting drug trafficking. Despite intense pressure from the Interior Ministry, lawmakers voted on March 20, 2025, to strike down a provision that would have forced messaging platforms like Signal and WhatsApp to implement backdoors in their secure communications systems.
"Why should we care about France rejecting some obscure provision in an anti-drug law? Because this vote wasn't just about France or drugs—it was about defending the digital security blanket that protects everyone's most sensitive communications," explains cybersecurity expert Eva Galperin.
The rejected proposal was part of the so-called "Narcotrafic" law (officially titled "Sortir la France du piège du narcotrafic" or "Freeing France from the drug trafficking trap"). While ostensibly aimed at combating illegal drug networks, digital rights organizations quickly identified the legislation as a "surveillance wish list disguised as anti-drug legislation" that would have devastating consequences for online privacy.
At the heart of the controversy was Article 8 ter, which would have required encrypted messaging services to:
The most troubling aspect was the resurrection of the widely discredited "ghost participant" model—a surveillance technique that pretends not to be a backdoor but functions exactly like one in practice.
The "ghost participant" or "ghost user" concept first gained prominence in 2018 when officials from GCHQ (the UK's equivalent of the NSA) proposed it as a seemingly more palatable alternative to traditional encryption backdoors.
Unlike directly breaking encryption algorithms, the ghost approach would force messaging platforms to silently add law enforcement as an invisible participant in encrypted conversations. Just like adding a third person to a group chat—except the other participants would never know they weren't alone.
"It's relatively easy for a service provider to silently add a law enforcement participant to a group chat or call," claimed the original GCHQ proposal. "You end up with everything still being end-to-end encrypted, but there's an extra 'end' on this particular communication."
But security experts immediately identified fatal flaws in this approach. For the ghost to work, messaging apps would need to:
As the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) explained in their analysis, "regardless of what they're calling it, the 'ghost' is still a mandated encryption backdoor with all the security and privacy risks that come with it."
The French proposal faced overwhelming opposition from technical experts who uniformly agreed that you cannot create a backdoor that only "good actors" can use.
Amsterdam-based security researcher Roel Schouwenberg explains: "The mathematical reality is inescapable—once you introduce a vulnerability into an encryption system, you've made it vulnerable for everyone, not just law enforcement. It's like installing a secret door in a bank vault and expecting only police to find it."
The key technical objections centered around several inescapable flaws:
As Matthew Green, cryptography professor at Johns Hopkins University, noted: "A backdoor for the 'good guys' only is not possible. The same vulnerability that lets police read your messages will eventually let criminals and hostile governments do the same."
The French lawmakers who rejected the backdoor provision deserve substantial credit for listening to technical experts and digital rights organizations rather than caving to pressure from security agencies.
La Quadrature du Net, a French digital rights group, played a critical role in mobilizing opposition to the proposal. Their advocacy efforts helped lawmakers understand that encryption protects not just criminals but everyday citizens—including journalists, medical professionals, abuse survivors, and anyone seeking privacy in an increasingly surveilled digital world.
The parliamentary session debating the bill was reportedly tumultuous, with some members even calling lawmakers who submitted the amendments "gun mules." In a strange twist of fate, the electronic voting system in the National Assembly broke down during the session, forcing members to vote using the old-fashioned method of standing up one by one to verbally state their position—an ironic technical failure during a vote about technological capabilities.
This victory didn't happen by accident. It came after sustained public pressure, expert testimony, and tireless advocacy from civil society groups across France and beyond. Organizations including the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Global Encryption Coalition, and Tuta (formerly Tutanota), a secure email provider, raised alarms about the proposal's dangers.
France's rejection of encryption backdoors sends a powerful message to governments worldwide: you don't have to sacrifice fundamental digital rights in the name of security.
This decision comes at a critical moment in the global "crypto wars"—the ongoing struggle between governments seeking access to encrypted communications and privacy advocates fighting to protect secure systems.
Just weeks before the French vote, Apple discontinued its Advanced Data Protection feature for users in the UK rather than comply with government demands to build in backdoor access. The UK's Online Safety Act has been particularly aggressive in targeting encrypted communications, raising concerns among privacy experts globally.
Similar battles are unfolding in Australia, the United States, and elsewhere, as governments continue to promote the false narrative that encryption primarily benefits criminals rather than legitimate users.
"France's decision demonstrates that it is possible to balance security concerns with fundamental digital rights," noted privacy advocate Max Schrems. "This should serve as both a model and a warning to other governments considering similar legislation."
The defeated proposal highlights a fundamental misunderstanding among many policymakers about encryption's role in modern society. Far from being merely a tool for privacy enthusiasts or criminals, encryption has become essential digital infrastructure protecting everything from banking systems to healthcare records.
The Global Encryption Coalition, in their statement opposing the French proposal, emphasized that "encryption is vital to protecting France's interests" and noted that the French government itself relies heavily on encryption for its own security.
Ironically, the bill would have endangered Olvid, a French messaging app certified by the French cybersecurity agency ANSII and officially recommended to French ministers and government officials.
The Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libertés (CNIL), France's data protection authority, had also opposed the measure, stating that "no provision should be able to be interpreted as prohibiting or weakening encryption."
While digital rights advocates celebrate this victory, the fight to protect encryption is far from over. History suggests that defeated surveillance proposals often return in modified form, sometimes attached to unrelated legislation or pushed through during times of crisis.
"For the foreseeable future, misguided lobbyists for police and national security agencies will continue to push similar proposals—perhaps repackaged, or rushed through quieter legislative moments," warned the EFF in their analysis of the vote.
The technical and policy communities must remain vigilant against future attempts to undermine encryption, while continuing to educate lawmakers about the critical role secure communications play in protecting both national security and individual rights.
For now, though, users of encrypted services like Signal, WhatsApp, and Tuta can breathe a little easier knowing that French lawmakers have defended their right to private conversations—and in doing so, set an important precedent for the ongoing global debate over encryption.
At its core, this debate revolves around a technical reality that many policymakers struggle to accept: encryption that can be broken for one purpose can be broken for all purposes.
End-to-end encryption works by ensuring that only the intended recipients of a message can decrypt and read its contents. Even the service providers themselves cannot access the encrypted content—that's the whole point. This creates a digital environment where private conversations remain private, medical records remain confidential, and financial transactions remain secure.
When governments demand backdoor access, they're essentially asking for systems that are secure against everyone except themselves—a technical contradiction that security experts universally agree is impossible to achieve safely.
As Bruce Schneier, one of the world's foremost security technologists, has repeatedly emphasized: "You can't build a backdoor that only the good guys can walk through."
The French Assembly's rejection of encryption backdoors represents a crucial recognition that privacy and security are complementary, not contradictory, values.
Real security comes not from weakening encryption but from strengthening investigative techniques, improving international cooperation, and investing in targeted technologies that don't compromise the digital security of entire populations.
As we move further into an era where virtually every aspect of modern life depends on secure digital systems, preserving strong encryption becomes not just a matter of privacy but of fundamental economic and national security. The French lawmakers who recognized this reality have taken an important stand for a safer digital future—one where our most sensitive conversations remain truly private.
End-to-end encryption is a security system where only the communicating users can read the messages. In principle, it prevents potential eavesdroppers – including telecom providers, internet providers, malicious actors, and even the platform provider itself – from accessing the cryptographic keys needed to decrypt the conversation.
The ghost participant approach would have required messaging platforms to silently add law enforcement as an invisible third participant in encrypted conversations. This would allow authorities to monitor messages without alerting users that their private chats were being surveilled.
No. Once a backdoor is created, it undermines security for all users. There's no technical way to create an access point that only "authorized" parties can use. Any vulnerability built into a system will eventually be discovered and exploited by other actors.
Law enforcement agencies have many investigative tools that don't require breaking encryption. These include targeted device hacking, metadata analysis, traditional surveillance, and human intelligence. The debate isn't about whether law enforcement should have investigative powers, but whether undermining encryption security for everyone is an acceptable approach.
Yes. History shows that defeated surveillance proposals often return in modified form, sometimes attached to unrelated legislation or pushed through during crises. Digital rights advocates will need to remain vigilant against future attempts to undermine encryption.
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